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Abstract 
A significant amount of non-compliance with the personal income tax is due to 
individuals who have not filed a tax return and so who are not “in the system”. We use 
experimental laboratory methods to examine the effect of positive inducements for filing 
a tax return. Our design captures the essential features of a voluntary income reporting 
and tax assessment system: human participants earn income, they must decide 
whether to file a tax return, and, conditional upon filing, they must choose how much 
income to report. Taxes are paid on reported income only. Unreported income of filers 
may be discovered via a random audit, and the participant then pays owed taxes plus a 
fine. Inducements for filing are introduced as treatments: a social safety net (e.g., 
unemployment replacement income) that is conditional upon past filing behavior, and a 
tax credit that is available only to those who file. Our results suggest that an untargeted 
tax credit can encourage participation, but that targeting the credit to low income 
earners offers a stronger inducement to file. Also, the provision of a social safety net via 
unemployment benefits has a positive, albeit an indirect, impact on participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords 
Tax evasion; Tax compliance; Behavioral economics; Experimental economics 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A significant amount of non-compliance associated with the individual income tax in 
many countries is due to the taxpayers who are not “in the system,” not having filed a 
tax return in the recent past or perhaps ever. Of course, individuals with taxable income 
are in most countries required to file a tax return, at least if their income exceeds some 
threshold level. However, many individuals ignore this legal requirement, choosing 
instead to take their chances in the tax compliance game by not filing a return. In this 
regard, individuals are often encouraged in their non-filing because enforcement 
mechanisms are typically tied to the existence of a tax return. This administrative 
feature makes non-filing especially attractive: a non-filer avoids the financial burden of 
calculating and paying taxes while simultaneously reducing the probability of detection, 
sometimes to zero. Cowell (1990) and Erard and Ho (2001) have referred to those who 
do not file as “ghosts”. This phenomenon is most prevalent among individuals who 
receive income not subject to third-party reporting or withholding.1 While the amounts 
owed by such taxpayers on their incomes are often individually small, the aggregate 
amount contributes substantially to the tax gap.2 For policy makers, the task is 
encouraging these individuals to file a tax return. This paper uses experimental 
laboratory methods to examine positive inducements for tax filing. 
 
The traditional policy response has relied upon greater penalties for non-compliance. 
However, while audits and fines may be useful instruments for encouraging more 
reporting by those who already file a tax return (i.e., reporting compliance), these tools 
are largely ineffective in capturing non-filers (i.e., filing compliance) because 
enforcement is in most circumstances directed only at individuals who have filed a 
return ( Erard and Ho, 2001). Positive inducements may be more effective in this 
regard. However, their impact is unknown. 
 
The tax system offers some potential avenues for encouraging tax filing via positive 
inducements. One prominent class of policies is the receipt of direct benefits under 
various transfer programs for which all citizens are eligible. Included here are programs 
broadly classified as “social insurance”, such as unemployment insurance. The receipt 
of benefits associated with these programs can encourage tax filing, since filing a return 
may be made a condition for eligibility and since past tax filings may be used to 
determine benefits. 
 
The use of tax credits is a more targeted approach. These programs often provide tax 
credits that are conditional upon filing, which thereby create incentives for individuals to 
participate in the tax system. The U.S. earned income tax credit (EITC) is a prominent 
example of this program type. The provisions of the EITC restrict participation to 
relatively low income earners, with the bulk of benefits going to families with children. 
However, the forms required to claim the EITC are somewhat complicated, and this 
feature has probably led to lower participation.3 Audit procedures under the program 
impose an additional cost on participants, which may have further reduced participation 
among this class of taxpayers; indeed, there has been targeted auditing of those filing 
for the credit. Even so, a significant percentage of EITC participants would be outside 
the tax system in the absence of the program (Scholz, 1994 and Kopczuk and Pop-
Eleches, 2007). The child care expense tax credit is another example of a targeted tax 
credit that encourages filing. 
 
The difficulty in assessing the effects of such policies is an obvious one: any such 
effects depend on the behavioral responses of individuals currently not filing tax returns 
and so not currently observable by the tax authority. Under-reporting behavior of 
individuals who file a return is notoriously difficult to observe in the field; non-filing 
behavior is even more hidden. Indeed, studies of non-filing using field data are sparse. 
One study by Crain and Nourzad (1993) compared the characteristics of those who 
evade taxes while filing versus those who choose simply to not file. The Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) has also conducted studies of delinquent returns to ascertain 
factors specific to non-filers ( Graeber et al., 1992). The most comprehensive study of 
non-filing was by Erard and Ho (2001), who used IRS information to estimate the factors 
that affect non-filing. 
 
As with all studies based on field data, however, these studies suffer from various 
difficulties, from being forced to contend with various econometric issues (e.g., the 
endogeneity of audit selection arising from budgets for audit activities), from not always 
having direct measures of non-compliance (e.g., the use of reported income, not 
unreported income), and especially from the inability to control for all variables that 
might affect taxpayer decisions (e.g., changes in the tax laws, taxpayer attitudes, 
economic conditions). Further, there are few changes in the rules for tax credits and/or 
income support programs, and those few changes are often confounded with other 
effects such as changes in macroeconomic conditions. 
 
Since it is the behavioral responses of individuals whom the tax authority cannot directly 
observe that are of interest, the laboratory is a natural arena to investigate the effects of 
policies aimed at increasing tax participation. Although there are numerous 
experimental studies that examine behavioral responses of those individuals who 
already file a tax return (Becker et al., 1987, Webley et al., 1991, Alm et al., 1992a, Alm 
et al., 1993 and Cummings et al., 2009), there are no experimental analyses of filing 
behavior, in which subjects have the option to file or not to file a tax return. There are 
also no analyses of the effects of positive inducements on filing behavior. 
 
Accordingly, our research here is directed at assessing the behavioral effects on filing of 
providing incentives for an individual to file a return, where these benefits are received 
only if the taxpayer files a return. To examine these responses, we introduce in a 
controlled laboratory setting various positive filing inducements, including social safety 
nets (e.g., unemployment replacement income) and income tax credits that are given 
either to low income participants or to all income levels. In both cases, benefits are 
available only to those who file a tax return. We find evidence that an untargeted tax 
credit can encourage participation, but that targeting the credit to low income earners 
offers a stronger inducement to file. We also find that the provision of a social safety net 
via unemployment benefits has a positive, albeit an indirect, impact on participation. In 
the process, our framework provides a more general–and a more realistic–analysis of 
individual compliance decisions because we incorporate both the filing and the reporting 
decisions. 
 
2. The filing versus the reporting decision 
The traditional theoretical development of the reporting decision typically begins with the 
assumption that the individual has already chosen to file a return. Following Becker 
(1968), evasion is then modeled as a gamble in which the states of nature are being 
caught or not being caught and, if caught, a fine is assessed ( Allingham and Sandmo, 
1972). The individual decides only the amount of income to report and so the amount to 
evade, and a rational individual is viewed as maximizing the expected utility of the tax 
evasion gamble, weighing the benefits of successful cheating against the risky prospect 
of detection and punishment. The individual reports income and pays taxes because he 
or she is afraid of getting caught and penalized if he or she does not report all income. 
This approach gives the plausible result that compliance depends upon audit rates and 
fine rates. Indeed, the central point of this approach is that an individual pays taxes 
because – and only because – of the fear of detection and punishment. 
 
However, the filing decision is also of interest, and has seldom been examined. To the 
extent that the tax administration is unaware of non-filers, they face little or no risk of 
being selected for audit, so that the traditional policy response of increased enforcement 
efforts is not particularly effective. Indeed, the traditional Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
analysis of the reporting decision do not fully capture the elements of the individual's 
filing decision because submitting a tax return with underreported liabilities is inherently 
different from failing to submit a return at all. 7 Evasion while reporting raises the specter 
of an audit; an individual who has not filed a return may be exposed to a much lower 
risk of audit. However, if the individual who has not filed a return is in fact detected as 
having not filed, there may be additional penalties. The tradeoff is a lower probability of 
detection for non-filing versus a higher penalty for detected non-filing. For this filing 
decision, the individual must compare the expected utility from filing versus the 
expected utility from non-filing, where an individual who files must also then determine 
the amount of income to report on the return. 
 
Erard and Ho (2001) discuss and analyze these issues, by expanding the traditional 
model to include both the filing and the reporting compliance decisions. They construct 
a sequential decision that includes such steps as the choice of income withholding, the 
decision to file, and the reporting decision. In their framework, the decision to file or not 
is influenced by the costs of filing, the probability of being identified as a non-filer, and 
the penalties for not filing. To these, one should also incorporate the potential benefits 
from such tax credits as may exist (e.g., the EITC) and/or the existence of a social 
safety net, both of which may be conditional on prior tax filings and both of which 
represent positive inducements to file. 8 In this expanded framework, it is straightforward 
to show that an increase in the tax credit or in the level of income support increases the 
return to filing a tax return, other things equal. Other variables (e.g., the tax rate, the fine 
rate) have more complicated effects. It is the positive inducements for filing from tax 
credits and income support programs that our experimental design investigates. 
 
3. Experimental design 
3.1. General experimental features 
The experimental design captures the essential features of the voluntary income 
reporting and tax assessment system used in many countries. Human participants in a 
controlled laboratory environment earn income through their performance in a task. The 
participants must decide first whether to file a tax return and then, conditional upon filing 
a return, how much of this income to report to a tax agency. Taxes are paid on reported 
income only. If an individual files a return, any unreported 
 
 
Fig. 1. Tax form after completion by subject and before filing. 
 
income may be discovered via a random audit, and the individual must then pay the 
owed taxes plus a fine based on the unpaid taxes. The probability of detection if the 
individual does not file is set at zero, to reflect the fact in most countries that an 
individual who does not file faces no effective chance of detection.9 Subjects are fully 
and accurately informed about the various features of the experimental setting (e.g., tax 
rates, penalty rates, audit rates, tax form costs, tax credits, unemployment benefits, and 
the like). This income earning, income reporting, audit, and penalty process is repeated 
over a number of rounds each representing a tax period. At the completion of the 
experiment, all participants are paid in cash their laboratory market earnings converted 
to U.S. dollars. 
 
Participants are recruited from the pool of undergraduate students and staff at a major 
public university using the Online Recruiting System for Experimental Economics 
(ORSEE) developed by Greiner (2004). Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants are 
assigned to a computer station with each station being situated in an isolation carrel. 
The lab server assigns participants to groups (consisting of 7–10 persons depending on 
the total number of participants in the session) and there are always two groups in a 
session to implement anonymity. Basic instructions are provided via a hardcopy and 
also via a series of screen images; see the Appendices for representative instructions 
and Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 for representative screen images.10 There is no interaction 
between the participants and the person running the experiment beyond the initial 
seating of the participants at terminals and the reading of the consent sheet. Decisions 
are made privately and participants are not allowed to communicate with one another 
during the session; participants also do not sign consent forms to further increase 
anonymity. Participants are informed (via the consent sheet) that all responses are 
anonymous, that no individual identification will be collected, and that the only record of 
participation will be the receipt signed to receive payment at the end of the session. 
Participants are told (via the instructions) that payments will be made in private at the 
end of the session. Since payoffs depend on multiple decisions made by each 
participant as well as on the random audit process, the person making the payments 
cannot assess participant decisions from the level of the aggregate payoffs at the end of 
the session. Taken together, these experimental procedures effectively eliminate both 
subject-to-subject interaction and subject-to-experimenter interaction. 
 
 
Fig. 2. End-of-round summary screen with audit results (if any). 
 
Participants are not told the exact duration of the experimental session, which is 
predetermined to last for 20 real rounds. Including instruction, three practice rounds, 
and the 20 real rounds, sessions take on average 70 min to complete. Participant 
earnings range from $16 to $38, depending upon task earnings, filing and reporting 
behavior, and audit experience. 
 
The detailed steps of the experiment can be briefly described. The earnings task 
requires the participants to sort randomly arranged digits. The task is timed, with the 
fastest person in the group earning the highest payment and the slowest the least 
payment. Earnings range from 100 lab dollars down to 10 lab dollars in increments of 10 
lab dollars. 
 
Once all participants have completed the income task, they are informed via the 
computer of their income for the round, and are then presented with a screen that 
provides the details of the tax policy in effect. Here they are informed of the tax rate, the 
audit probability, and the penalty rate on discovered evasion, as well as the details of 
the treatment policy intervention. The tax form is not yet provided. This feature 
simulates the need for the participant to collect the information needed to file a return. 
Participants may choose to get a form or not, and there is a tax form cost (reflective of 
the overall costs of tax filing) that varies from 0 to 2 lab dollars. If the participant 
chooses not to obtain a tax form, then they do not file and are not subject to an audit in 
the current round. This feature mirrors the typical feature of tax systems that individuals 
who do not file a return face a significantly lower (often zero) chance of audit. If the 
participant chooses to get the form, then the cost is deducted from the participant's 
income for the round. If the participant has obtained the form, he or she may still choose 
to not file by selecting the “Not File” button on the tax form screen. Since the tax filing 
season is limited in the field, there is a time limit imposed (75 s) in the experiment, and 
a counter at the bottom of the tax form informs the participants of the time remaining. If 
the time expires and a tax form has not been filed, then the participant is automatically 
audited and an additional 10 percent penalty is imposed. Since the “Not File” button is 
always available, the timer simply imposes the requirement that a decision be recorded 
within the time limit. 
 
The process of determining who is audited is generated by a computerized draw. After 
the return is filed, the participants are presented with an animated (computerized) 
representation of a bucket from which a draw is made. In this bucket there are 10 balls 
(either blue or white) with a white ball signifying no audit and a blue ball denoting an 
audit. Each taxpayer is audited independently. The balls “bounce” in this bucket, and, 
after a randomly determined interval, a door opens and a ball exits the bucket through 
this door. The color indicates whether the individual is audited. Participants choosing 
not to file a tax return are presented with a screen that informs them that they will not be 
audited in the current round. Subjects know only the result of their own audit process 
and not the results for the other subjects. After the audit process has been completed, 
the taxpayers are presented with a new screen that provides the earnings and audit 
outcome summary for the round. 
 
At the end of the session, the participants complete a short questionnaire in which they 
report their age, gender, and whether they prepare and file their own taxes (a measure 
of their direct experience with the tax system). 
 
Table 1. No inducement treatment (NIT) settings. 
 
 
Table 2. Income tax credit treatment (CRT) settings. 
 
 
3.2. Experimental treatments 
Our objective is to examine the effects of positive inducements to file a tax return. To 
establish a baseline, we conduct sessions in which positive inducements are absent but 
in which the other features of the tax filing regime are incorporated. The “No 
Inducement Treatments” (denoted “NIT”) are described in Table 1. The tax rate is set at 
35 percent throughout all sessions, and the audit probabilities are set at 0.3 or 0.4, with 
two values in use in each session. The audit rate is set for the first 8 rounds, changes 
for the second 8 rounds, and reverts to the original level for the final 4 rounds. Thus, in 
Table 1, the audit rates for NIT are 0.4 for 8 rounds, 0.3 for 8 rounds, and 0.4 for the 
final 4 rounds. Participants are instructed that the audit rate may change during the 
course of the session, but they are not told the specific pattern. 
 
The first set of positive filing inducements consists of tax credits targeted at lower 
income taxpayers. This targeting is typically motivated by equity concerns, but it has the 
collateral effect of addressing a specific set of “ghosts”, or those with lower incomes 
who may well be earning incomes that are not matched by employer records submitted 
to the tax authority. In another tax credit treatment all subjects are eligible for the credit. 
For the credit treatments, the participants are informed of the level of the tax credit that 
they are eligible to receive and that receipt of this amount is conditional upon filing a tax 
return. The two tax credit settings are shown in Table 2 as CRT1 and CRT2, where 
“CRT” denotes “credit treatment” and where the key difference between these 
treatments is the targeting of the income tax credit to lower income earners in CRT2. 
For example, in CRT1 (“income tax credit”) the formula for the credit CR is 
CR = 20 − 0.2 × X, where X is the amount of earned income and the base credit is 20 
lab dollars. If the participant earns, say, 60 lab dollars, then the credit is 8 lab dollars; 
the credit goes to zero when the participant has earned 100 lab dollars, which is the 
maximum income level possible. In the “low income tax credit” CRT2, the formula is 
CR = 30 − 0.6 × X, so the base credit is set at 30 lab dollars and the credit drops to zero 
when the participant has earned 50 lab dollars. 
 
The other positive inducement is the presence of an income support program that pays 
benefits in the event of the individual becoming unemployed. The parameters for this 
series of sessions are shown in Table 3, where “UBT” denotes “unemployment benefits 
treatment”. Participants are informed of the probability of being unemployed, the 
duration of unemployment, and the income support they are eligible to receive; again, 
they are told that receipt is conditional upon filing and upon the level of income that is 
reported on these filings. The probability of unemployment is determined by a random 
draw for each participant, and equals either 20 percent or 40 percent. The 
unemployment benefits are determined as follows. The number of filing periods for 
eligibility is stated in the instructions as 2 periods, and the benefit is a stated 50 percent 
of the average of the incomes reported on filing during the periods required for eligibility. 
(We also combine unemployment benefits with the low income tax credit in some 
sessions.) During the periods of unemployment, the participant does not have the 
opportunity to earn income (and the income earning task screen is suppressed). 
Instead, subjects are presented with a screen informing them that they are unemployed 
and that this is round x of unemployment period of duration y. The unemployment 
benefits are assumed to be taxable. If the participant files a tax return reporting their 
unemployment benefit income, then they are subject to the normal audit process; if the 
participant chooses to not file, then they are not audited. 
 
3.3. Expected value calculations 
It is useful to calculate the expected value of the compliance gamble in the various 
treatments. For example, in the baseline (or NIT) sessions, the expected value from 
filing a tax return EV(Filing) equals [(1 − p)(I − tX − C) + p(I − tX − (1 + f)t(I − X) − C)], 
where p is the probability that a tax return is selected for audit, t is the tax rate on 
reported income, f is the penalty rate on  
 
Table 3. Unemployment benefits treatment (UBT) settings. 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics. 
 
 
undeclared taxes, I is the individual's “true” income, X is the amount of reported income, 
and C is the tax form cost. When p = 0.3, t = 0.35, f = 0.5, and C = 0, EV(Filing) equals 
65 for I = 100 and X = 100. In contrast, the expected value from non-filing EV(Non-filing) 
equals [(1 − q)I + q(I − (1 + f)tI)], where q is the probability that an individual who has 
not filed a return is apprehended by an audit. Given parameter values (mainly q = 0), 
the expected value from non-filing equals 100. In general, there is no incentive for 
individuals to file in the NIT sessions, even for different levels of reported income. 
 
However, the presence of positive inducements can give individuals a strong incentive 
to file a return. For example, an individual receiving the low income tax credit (CRT2) 
who files a tax return with zero reported income has an expected value of 114.25, a 
level well above EV(Non-filing). Similar incentives for filing are present for the general 
income tax credit (CRT1) and the unemployment benefits (UBT) treatments. 11 Overall, 
then, our experimental design suggests that filing should increase under the 
inducements offered by the tax credit and the social safety net provisions. Of course, 
different attitudes toward risk can affect these calculations. 
 
Note that with the exception of CRT1 in which all income levels are eligible, the positive 
inducements applied here are intended to target lower income taxpayers. In CRT2, the 
tax credits apply to 50–90 percent of the income earners; in UBT the unemployment 
benefit safety net pays out 50 percent of average earnings. Because of this targeting, 
the net tax yield from the participants in all of these settings is quite small when the 
proposed programs are implemented. For the settings in which there are 10 participants 
in a group (the typical case) and the income distribution ranges from a high of 100 lab 
dollars to a low of 10 lab dollars, total income is 550 lab dollars; at a tax rate of 35 
percent applied to the net of deduction (15 percent) income, the tax yield for full 
compliance is 110 lab dollars per round. By way of comparison, the per-round cost of 
the income tax credit CRT1 is 90 lab dollars, and the per-round cost of the low income 
tax credit CRT2 is 60 lab dollars; for the social safety net (unemployment benefits), 
there is an expected cost under full compliance and filing of 90 lab dollars. Thus, the net 
yield to the tax authority is generally small. Nevertheless, if the objective is to increase 
filing, the programs that we investigate must be judged against this target. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
A total of 218 subjects participated in 14 sessions. Table 4 reports the means and  
 
Table 5. Frequency of form obtained, form filed, and reported full, by treatment. 
 
 
standard deviations of the main variables of interest. The experimental design entails 
the following treatment variables: the cost of obtaining the tax form (form cost), the audit 
probability, the opportunity to claim a general income tax credit (income tax credit), the 
opportunity to claim a low income tax credit (low income tax credit), and the availability 
of unemployment benefits (unemployment benefits). Observed outcomes include the 
subject's earned income (income), whether the subject purchased the tax form (form 
bought), whether the subject filed the form (form filed), and whether the subject reported 
all income (report full). Subjects averaged 29.8 years of age (the range being ages 18–
71), and 41 percent were male (sex, equal to 1 if male and 0 if female). The typical 
participant earned nearly 50 lab dollars per round, obtained a tax form about 70 percent 
of the time, and filed the form nearly 68 percent of the time. Among the subjects who 
filed a form, 83 percent complied by reporting their full tax obligation. In only 4 instances 
(out of 4324 observations) did a subject not complete the various tasks within the 75 s 
limit. 
 
Table 5 summarizes subject/taxpayer behavior by treatment. A substantial number of 
participants file a tax return even when there is no obvious incentive.12 In the “no 
inducement treatment” settings, 65 percent of the participants file a return.  
 
This behavior is consistent with similar observations in the field, in which many 
individuals disclose income even though the probability of detection via an audit is 
extremely low. Indeed, as argued by Webley et al. (1991) and others, observed levels of 
tax compliance can only be explained by extreme forms of risk aversion (Bernasconi, 
1998) or by the presence of different “types” of individuals in the population (Bloomquist, 
2011) some of whom are innately compliant and others who are innately non-compliant. 
Since the participants in these experiments know with certainty they will not be audited 
if they do not file a tax return, we appear to be observing a base level of innate 
compliance. However, in any experiment the key observation is the differential behavior 
that accompanies the introduction of treatment effects; that is, what is of most interest is 
not so much the level of filing compliance but the change in this behavior, as reflected in 
the responses of the subjects to changes in the incentives to file ( Alm, 1991). 
 
Turning to the treatment effects, we first review the frequencies of obtaining and filing a 
form reported in the second and third columns. The aggregate numbers suggest that 
the general tax credit does not alter the decision to obtain and file forms, but a more 
targeted low income tax credit does lead to significantly higher rates of obtaining and 
filing a form. The frequencies of obtaining and filing forms in the general income tax 
credit (CRT1) treatment are statistically equivalent to those observed in the NIT 
treatment (0.676 versus 0.673; 0.652 versus 0.640), while the frequencies are 
significantly higher in the low income tax credit (CRT2) treatment (0.734 versus 0.673; 
0.704 versus 0.652). The numbers also indicate that the presence of unemployment 
benefits (UBT) alone does little to influence the decision to obtain and file a form (0.659 
versus 0.676; 0.636 versus 0.652), but that unemployment benefits with the low income 
tax credit provide a strong inducement to obtain and file a form. In cases that entailed 
both unemployment benefits and the low income tax credit, the frequency of obtaining 
and filing a form was significantly greater than those observed in the no inducement 
treatment (0.855 versus 0.676; 0.813 versus 0.652). 
 
Beyond the issue of inducing filing via social programs, the question might arise 
whether the programs have an impact on the subsequent compliance decision of 
reporting the full tax obligation. The fourth column of Table 5 provides the frequency of 
full reporting decisions for those subjects who filed a form. The numbers suggest the 
presence of the social programs have little influence on under-reporting of tax 
obligations, with frequencies of full reporting statistically equivalent across treatments. 
Note, however, that full reporting was 4 percentage points higher in the low income tax 
credit treatment than in the NIT setting (0.867 versus 0.827). 
 
To test the strength of these initial impressions from the aggregate data, we conduct 
conditional analyses at the individual level that estimate treatment effects while holding 
other factors constant. We estimate the following empirical model: 
 
 
 
with 
 
 
 
where Ti,t* denotes the latent variable for subject i  's filing decision in period t  ; T  i,t 
is the observed indicator function, equal to 1 if Ti,t*>0 and equal to 0 if 
Ti,t*≤0; Pi,t is the price that subject i must pay to obtain a tax form in period t; Ii is subject 
i's earned income in period t; pi,t is the audit probability for subject i in period t; CRi and 
UBi are indicator variables that signify the presence of a tax credit and unemployment 
benefits for subject i; LUBi,t−2 is an indicator variable that signifies that subject i received 
unemployment benefits two periods prior; Di is a vector of demographic variables (e.g., 
subject age and sex); ψt is a set of T − 1 dummies that capture potential non-linear 
period effects; ui are random effects that control for unobservable individual 
characteristics 13; ɛi,t is the contemporaneous additive error term; βk is the coefficient for 
variable k. We also include interaction variables between income and both tax credits 
for subject i in time t. 
 
Table 6. Estimation results. 
 
 
From this specification, we estimate three models: obtaining a tax form (Ti,t = 1 if the 
form is bought and 0 otherwise); filing a tax form (Ti,t = 1 if the form is filed and 0 
otherwise); reporting full tax obligation (Ti,t = 1 if all income is reported and 0 otherwise). 
14 For each, we estimate the basic specification using both a linear probability model 
and a non-linear probit specification, in each case controlling for subject heterogeneity 
and time period effects. 15 We limit the presentation in Table 6 to the marginal effects 
derived from the probit estimates. 
The conditional estimates in Table 6 clarify our initial impressions. The presence of tax 
credits and unemployment benefits clearly encourages individual tax filing. Regarding 
tax credits, the conditional results show that both the regular (CRT1) and the more 
targeted (CTR2) tax credits significantly increase the likelihood of obtaining and filing a 
tax form, with the low income tax credit providing a larger marginal effect. This finding 
suggests that a targeted program is more effective in encouraging behavior. Estimated 
marginal effects on the interaction terms indicate that this positive impact diminishes 
with income, a result consistent with expectations because the credit is targeted to 
lower income participants and any impact from the credit will be negatively correlated 
with income. 
 
Estimates concerning the influence of unemployment benefits provide mixed results. 
The mere presence of an unemployment benefits program does not appear to increase 
filing. However, an indirect effect exists from increased filing by individuals receiving 
benefits in the past, as shown by the estimated marginal effect on the unemployment 
benefits received variable. This variable indicates whether a current income earner was 
unemployed and received unemployment benefits in the previous two periods, and its 
estimate suggest that the likelihood of filing is affected by the previous receipt of 
unemployment benefits (p < 0.01). 
 
We again examine the secondary question of whether social programs might influence 
the decision to under-report tax obligations. Estimates generally mimic those reported 
for the filing decisions, though several differences arise. The presence of unemployment 
benefits has a significant negative effect on the likelihood of fully reporting income and 
tax obligations. Also, the low income tax credit has no significant effect on the reporting 
decision. 
 
Confidence in the internal validity of the data, and therefore in the results, is provided by 
the correspondence of remaining estimates with a priori expectations established in 
theoretical studies, as well as in other experimental studies.16 Our results show that the 
likelihood of obtaining a tax form is negatively related to the cost of getting the form and 
that the level of earned income is positively related to participation.17 Our estimates also 
show that changes in audit probability have no significant effect on participation, a result 
that is likely due to the small range of audit probabilities used in our experimental 
design. Finally, the estimated marginal effects of the age and sex variables are 
consistent with past work in this area. 
 
An interesting extension is to consider how the social programs affect net tax receipts. 
In Table 7, we first consider tax receipts independent of program cost by reviewing the 
mean individual tax payment as a percent of total tax obligation (with  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Tax payments by treatment. 
 
 
standard deviations in parentheses). The numbers show little difference between the 
two tax credit treatments and the No Inducement treatment, but reveal more under-
reporting in the unemployment benefits treatments. Incorporating program cost, Table 7 
also reports the mean net tax payments (with standard deviations) made by filers, which 
show considerable variation across treatments. The NIT and UBT settings yield the 
highest payments, while the CRT setting offers much lower payments. The combination 
of unemployment benefits and income tax credits yields the lowest mean tax payment. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The presence of non-filers has important policy implications. Fiscally induced allocation 
of effort leads to inefficiencies, and tax evasion via non-filing by “ghosts” also leads to 
misallocation through differentials from relative payoffs between official (taxed) and 
unofficial (untaxed) activity. Non-filing generates inequities due to differential treatment 
of those who file and those who do not. There is, finally and obviously, a revenue loss 
from non-filing. 
 
Our experimental results suggest several promising strategies for encouraging greater 
filing rates. In particular, our results indicate that an can encourage participation, but 
that targeting the credit to low income earners offers a stronger inducement to file. The 
provision of a social safety net via unemployment benefits also has a positive, albeit 
indirect, impact on participation. These results should help in the design of other 
programs designed to address non-filing. Further, our results suggest that reminding 
potential filers of the existence of credits and social safety nets should be a part of these 
programs. More broadly, our results indicate that strategies to improve compliance must 
be based on more than the “stick” of increased enforcement but should include the 
“carrot” of positive inducements for filing. 
 
Of course, one may assert that the programs that we examine are simply methods that 
“pay” individuals to file tax returns. Even so, our results indicate that such positive 
incentives clearly do matter. The usual enforcement paradigm focuses on the use of 
negative incentives, or avoiding a penalty by filing. Here the focus is on positive 
incentives, or rewards for filing. Our results indicate that these positive incentives affect 
individual choices, and also that they may yield social benefits beyond tax compliance. 
The same cannot be said for negative incentives. 
 
A perhaps more fundamental issue is whether tax compliance experiments that utilize 
student subjects can generalize beyond the laboratory. This issue relates to the 
“external validity” of tax compliance experiments, and indeed of laboratory experiments 
more broadly. Levitt and List (2007) have argued persuasively that the “parallelism” 
(Smith, 1982 and Plott, 1987) between the laboratory setting and the naturally occurring 
world that must be present to generalize beyond the laboratory may not in fact be 
present in many cases. They argue specifically that there is often an excessive amount 
of “pro-social” behavior exhibited by human subjects in laboratory experiments 
compared to the level of such behavior observed in the real-world, and they identify 
several factors that they believe promote greater pro-social behavior in a laboratory 
setting. 
 
Even so, the issue of external validity cannot be answered in general, but must be 
examined in specific cases. Indeed, in other work (Alm et al., 2011) we show that the 
experimental responses of student subjects are very similar to the experimental 
responses of non-student subjects, in identical experiments; that is, students do not 
behave differently than non-students in identical experiments. We also compare the 
experimental responses of student subjects to non-student responses in the naturally 
occurring world using Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data, and we again find that there 
is no significant difference in behavior, in terms of mean compliance levels, the 
frequency distribution of compliance rates, and the econometrically estimated 
behavioral responses. Overall, the results of Alm et al. (2011) indicate that the observed 
behaviors of students and non-students, whether in the laboratory or in the naturally 
occurring world, are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
 
In short, we recognize that laboratory experiments must be used with some care. Even 
so, we believe that experimental results can provide a useful guide to real-world policy 
design. In particular, the ability to induce greater amounts of filing via positive 
inducements presents governments with a largely unutilized policy tool in the endless 
quest to deal with non-compliance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A. Experiment instructions, income tax credit treatment 
 
Experiment overview 
 
• You will be participating in a market simulation that lasts several decision “rounds”. 
• In each round, you first play an earnings game and then face a tax reporting decision. 
• Each round is completely independent from the others, which means your decisions in 
one round in no way affects the outcome of any other round. 
• In the tax reporting decision, you choose whether or not to fill out and file a tax form. 
 
If you file a tax form: 
 
• On the tax form, you decide how much to claim in deductions and how much to claim 
in tax credits. These two amounts determine your Final taxes paid. If “Final taxes paid” 
is a negative number, then this reflects a tax refund. 
• You will know the exact amount of your actual deduction and credit (this is displayed 
on the left side of the tax reporting screen). You can choose to claim any amount 
between 0 and 30 for the credit and any amount between 0 and your income earned for 
the deduction. 
• You have a 30 percent chance of being audited. Audits are determined completely at 
random and do not depend on your decisions or the decisions of others. 
• If you are not audited, or if you are audited but do not owe additional taxes, your 
earnings for the round are your income earned minus the final taxes paid. 
• If you are audited, your earnings for the round are adjusted as follows: 
∘ If the amount of deductions you claimed was more than what you were allowed, then 
you must pay taxes on the difference (unpaid taxes); 
∘ If the amount of credits you claimed was more than what you were allowed, then you 
must pay back the difference (unpaid taxes); 
∘ In addition, you pay a penalty equal to 150 percent multiplied by the amount of unpaid 
taxes (from deductions and credits). 
∘ If you claimed less in deductions and/or credits than you were allowed, you will not be 
refunded the difference. In this sense, the audit can never help you. 
 
If you do not file a tax form: 
 
• You will not be audited. 
• If you are not audited, your earnings for the round equal your income earned. 
 
 
Appendix B. Experiment instructions, unemployment benefits treatment 
 
Experiment overview 
 
• You will be participating in a market simulation that lasts several decision “rounds”. 
• In each round, you first play an earnings game and then face a tax reporting decision. 
• Each round is completely independent from the others, which means your decisions in 
one round in no way affects the outcome of any other round. 
• In the tax reporting decision, you choose whether or not to fill out and file a tax form. 
 
If you file a tax form: 
 
• On the tax form, you decide how much to income to report. This determines your final 
taxes paid. If “final taxes paid” is a negative number, then this reflects a tax refund. 
• You have a 30 percent chance of being audited. Audits are determined completely at 
random and do not depend on your decisions or the decisions of others. 
• If you are not audited, or if you are audited but do not owe additional taxes, your 
earnings for the round are your income earned minus the final taxes paid. 
• If you are audited, your earnings for the round are adjusted as follows: 
∘ If the amount of income you reported was less than what you earned, then you must 
pay back the difference (unpaid taxes);  
∘ In addition, you pay a penalty equal to 150 percent multiplied by the amount of unpaid 
taxes. 
 
If you do not file a tax form: 
 
• You will not be audited. 
• If you are not audited, your earnings for the round equal your income earned. 
During the experiment you may be unemployed: 
• This will be determined by a random draw. If you become unemployed this will last for 
two periods and you will not be able to earn income. You have a 20 percent chance of 
being unemployed each period. 
• If you have reported income in the previous two periods you will receive 
unemployment benefits. This is an income equal to the average of your reported income 
for the two previous periods and you will receive this income for the two periods when 
you are unemployed. 
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